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COMMENTS
EXPENSES OF A PROXY FIGHT
THE PROBLEM

OF REIMBURSEMENT

BY THE CORPORATION

Until recently, the questions presented by proxy fights in the
various corporations throughout America concerning whether or
not the corporation should be compelled to bear some or all of
the expenses incident to such fights have received comparatively
little attention from the courts. Even when they were considered,
the subject was not dealt with fully or adequately. Of course,
the chief reason for this is that few cases have ever arisen on
this subject, and those that did arise did not present all of the
issues involved to the court. As far as search reveals, only
seven cases have dealt specifically with this problem.'
The area of concern in this article encompasses not only
whether the management group which is in control of the corporation can finance their fight for control from the corporate
treasury, but also whether the insurgent group which is not in
control, but would like to be, can call upon the corporation to
bear some or all of their expenses. Separate problems arise in
both of the situations above mentioned, because we must consider whether management which loses the contest should be
able to charge the corporation the same as if they had won.
Suppose management draws directly on the treasury to pay for
their expenses, but at the time that they are ousted from ofici
there remains certain amounts which the directors have paid
personally and which have not been taken out of the treasury.
Can the old management then make a valid demand on the
new management to reimburse them for those expenses? Suppose the insurgents win the election, and then seek to take all of
the expenses of their fight out of the corporate treasury. Is this
a valid act? Or suppose the insurgents lose the election, but
ask the management to reimburse them for their expenses in1Peel v. London & North Western Lock & Hdwe. Co., (1907), 1 Ch. Div. 5; Hand v.
Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649 (D. Del. 1944); Hall v. Trans-Lux
Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 A.226 (1934); Empire Southern
Gas Co. v. Gray, 20 Del. Ch. 95, 46 A.2d 741 (Ch. 1946) ; Lawyers Advertising Co. v.
Consolidated Ry. Lighting & Refrigeration Co., 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907);
Rosenfield v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E. 2d 291 (1955) ;
Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) ; see Friedman, Expenses of
Corporate Proxy Contests, 51 COL. L. REV. 951 (1951).
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curred in wagering their fight for control. Is management bound
to reimburse them; or even if management wishes to reimburse
them, can it validly do so?
What of the type and amount of expenses incurred by each
side? Should all expenses be allowed, some of them, or none of
them? What kind of tests can the courts use to determine which
expenses should be allowed as a charge against the treasury,
assuming that some expenses can be allowed? Should the allowance of any reimbursement to either side depend upon stockholder approval? If so, what percentage of vote should be necessary to authorize it?
All of these problems and many more face the court every
time a proxy fight case is brought before it. Through the various
decisions on point some fairly definite and constant rules have
been established. However, there are still great areas of this
field as yet untouched by any authoritative court ruling or legislative direction. It is the purpose of this article to point out what
the law on these questions is as propounded by the courts, to
suggest places for improvement, and to further inquire into
some of the issues which as yet have not been litigated.
In the recent case of Rosenfield v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.2 there was a hard fought battle for control of the
corporation. Each side spent sums in excess of $100,000. While
the management group was in office, it drew upon the corporate
treasury and reimbursed itself for most of the expenses incurred.
However, they lost the election, and at the time the insurgent
group took office, there still remained some $28,000 which
the management group had paid, but which had not been taken
from the corporate treasury. When the insurgents took office,
they not only voted to reimburse themselves for all of their expenses,' but also reimbursed the old management group for the
Rosenfield v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., supra note 1.
Here the dissent violently objected to the allowance of any such reimbursement,
saying at page 300 (128 N.E.2d 291), "The corporation lacks power to defray the
expenses of the insurgents in their entirety." Three of the four majority judges specifically approved this reimbursement, but seemingly conditioned the validity of such
act upon the affirmative vote of the stockholders. This condition, however, was not
explicit, and it is not clear whether they think that this affirmative vote is absolutely
necessary before such an expenditure can be made, or whether that vote is mere
affirmation of an already valid act. The concurring judge (the 4th majority judge)
made no mention one way or the other of reimbursement to the insurgents who won
the election.
2
3
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$28,000." A minority stockholder brought a derivative action to
recover all the moneys paid out of the corporate treasury, seeking not only to recover the entire amount expended by the management, but also that amount paid to reimburse the winning
insurgents. On both counts his action failed, and the reimbursements were allowed to stand as made.'
The facts of this case raised almost every problem mentioned
above that is vital to a proxy fight: Can management recover for
its expenses while in office? Can management so recover after
it has been ousted from office? Can the insurgent group reimburse itself for expenses spent in gaining control of the corporation? What expenses are legitimate ones to charge against
the corporation, assuming that at least some of them are legitimate?
In considering these and other problems, it will be helpful to
segregate the topics under three main heads: I. Expenses of the
Management Group; II. Expenses of the Successful Opposition;
and III. Expenses of the Unsuccessful Opposition.
I. Expenses of the Management Group
The theory upon which all reimbursements by the corporation
are made is that the stockholders have a right to know exactly
what is going on in their corporation. To insure that adequate
disclosure of all pertinent information and material concerning
the issues to be raised at the coming election is made to the
stockholders so that they may make an intelligent choice of the
directors at such election, the corporation should bear the cost
of so informing them. Otherwise, such expenses would have to
be borne by the individual directors and their followers, which
4 The majority neglected to specifically mention their approval of the reimbursement to the old mangement of the $28,000. However, in view of their square holding
that management's expenses were properly chargeable to the corporation when the
contest is conducted in good faith over questions of policy, it appears that there was
no question but that this reimbursement was proper. The dissent sought to require
stockholder approval for this reimbursement.
5 This result of the case is somewhat weakened by the fact that the concurring
judge whose opinion tipped the scales in favor of the defendant corporation allowed
the reimbursements to stand only because the plantiff had failed to segregate the
unwarranted and excessive items of expense allegedly incurred by each faction in
the contest. It was clearly indicated that had such expenses been specifically challenged,
at least some of them would have been disallowed.
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is generally unworkable because of the tremendous amount of
expense involved.
Regardless of any opinions to the contrary, it is now firmly
established that management is entitled to reimburse itself from
the corporate treasury for its expenses incurred in the proxy
fight, when such fight is concerned with questions of corporate
policy.6 As a recent case has aptly put it:
Where the controversy is concerned with questions of policy as distinguished from personnel of management, . .. the incumbent directors
may. . . make such corporate expenditures as are reasonably necessary
to inform the stockholders of the considerations which the directors
deem sufficient to support the wisdom of the policy advocated by them
in the same communications ...they may solicit
and under attack; and
7
proxies in its favor.

Of course, the amounts spent while the directors are still in
office comes directly out of the corporate treasury and there is
no true reimbursement question involved. It is only when management loses the election without having already paid all of
their expenses from the treasury that reimbursement comes into
play. However, unless otherwise excepted, reimbursement, as
used herein, includes both the amounts taken from the corporate
treasury while management is still in office, and those amounts
remaining unpaid when the opposition takes over. This privilege
to use the corporate treasury at the time the expenses are incurred gives management a great advantage over the contesting
group which must pay the expenses of their fight from their own
pockets, with only a hope of winning the election and reimbursing themselves.'
For years, and in fact ever since the question first arose, the
courts have stated that proxy fight expenses will be allowed as
a charge against the corporation's treasury only when a cruestion
of policy, as opposed to a mere matter of personnel, is involved. 9
At first blush this requirement seems acceptable, but analyzation demonstrates that there are in fact few, if any, situations
6 See note 1, supra.
7 Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., supra note 1.
8 To date, as far as search reveals, there has been no case which allowed the losing
contesting group to secure reimbursement; hence, unless they win, as the law now
stands, their expenses are personal and they can get no relief from the coporation.
9 All of the cases cited in note 1 supra purportedly followed this guide in making
their decision in the particular case. See Comment, 49 MICH. L. REv. 605 (1951).
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when policy can be separated from personnel." The two are so
interwoven that a change in one necessarily involves a change
in the other. It is the personnel of the corporation that represents
the corporate policies, and hence when another group is fighting
to win the election, new policies as well as new personnel are
in issue. Further, although the courts have consistently given lip
service to this rule, there has never been a case which disallowed
any expenditure on the basis that it was not over a question of
corporate policy, with the possible exception of one case decided
in 1907.11
Therefore, considering the problem realistically, it is submitted that the better rule would be to acknowledge that the
management group has a call upon the treasury no matter what
issue is being contested, subject to the limitation that such expenses must be reasonable, and to do away with the legal fiction
that a policy issue must be involved. Regardless of any other
qualifications, however, each and every expense must meet the
test of reasonableness or be disallowed when challenged. 2
Whether this suggested rule is adhered to or not, once the
courts are satisfied that a question of policy is involved, they
are liberal in allowing all expenses reasonably necessary to
give the stockholders complete notice of all issues involved in
the fight. Thus it has been established that it is proper for management to give the notice to stockholders by an advertisement
in the newspapers." A Texas case has held that management may
include self-addressed stamped envelopes in the material sent to
the stockholders, to facilitate their answer and expression of
ideas. 4 Management may properly charge the corporation for
10 "It is impossible in many cases of intracorporate contests over directors, to sever
questions of policy from those of persons." Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen
Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 85, 171 A. 226, 229 (1934). "The simple fact, of course, is that
generally policy and personnel do not exist in separate compartments. A change in
personnel is sometimes indispensable to a change of policy. A new board may be the
symbol of the shift in policy as well as the means of obtaining it." Steinberg v. Adams,
90 F. Supp. 604, 608 (S.D. N.Y. 1950). "As in political contests, aspirants for control
are invariably presented under the guise of policy or principle." Rosenfield v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 290, 299 (1955).
11 Lawyers Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. Lighting & Refrigeration Co., supra
note 1.
12 Wording to that effect is found, in varying degrees of forcefulness, in the Hall,
Steinberg, and Rosenfield cases, supra note 1.
Is Lawyers Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. Lighting & Refrigeration Co., supra
note 1.
14 Bounds v. Stephenson, 187 S.W.1031 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) err. rel.
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the cost of any follow-up material necessary, to answer the opposition's charges or further explain management's positions. 5
However, as very ably pointed out in an excellent book, last
minute telegrams and long-distance telephone calls sent by management in an effort to obtain proxies should not be allowed as
proper corporate expenditures.'" The purpose of using corporate
funds, to insure presentatibn of both sides of the controversy
so that the stockholder is enabled to weigh the merits of each
and make his choice of the one appearing the most desirable to
him, has already been accomplished, and these last minute pleas
serve no purpose other than the personal interests of the directors making them.
Likewise, it appears that proxy solicitors are not, or at least
should not be hired by the use of corporate funds, with the exception that such hiring should logically be permitted when it
is necessary to obtain a specified percentage of the outstanding
shares in order to take some corporate action, such as a merger,
consolidation, or stock reclassification. 7 Use of proxy solicitors should also be allowed when quorum problems are present
if the result of the vote obtained by their use serves no personal
interest of the directors hiring them.'"
In the situation just mentioned, allowance of expenses for
proxy solicitors is justified by the fact that in such cases the directors have no personal interest in the outcome of the change
effected thereby, except insofar as the whole corporation is benefited. Therefore, if there is a benefit to the entire corporation,
the fact that some oppose the merger, consolidation, or stock
reclassification, should make no difference.
Professional solicitors, however, in any other case, serve no
purpose other than to enhance the chances of one side or the
other winning the election. The pressure brought to bear upon
the stockholders by them does not aid in the least the dissemina15 In Re Zickl, 73 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1947) ; Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen
Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 87, 171 A.226, 229 (1934) ; cf. Rasscover v. American Linseed Co.,
135 F. 341 (2d Cir. 1905).
16 EMERSON & LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 73 (1954). See Hill, Book Review, 9 Sw. L.J. 257 (1955).
17 FRIEDMAN, EXPENSES OF CORPORATE PROXY CONTESTS, 51 COL. L. REv. 951
(1951) ; cf. In Re Zickl, supra note 15.
18 Ibid.; Comment, 49 MICH. L. REv. 605 (1951).
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tion of information to the stockholders, and in fact defeats, in
part at least, the purpose of allowing management to use corporate funds to help wage the proxy fight. The stockholder is
often badgered into casting his vote in accordance with the proxy
solicitor's wishes, thus destroying his right and desire to make an
intelligent choice based upon his own opinion of the merits of
each side. Once the printed material has been fully dispersed
to the stockholders, there is no need for further contact with
them, since such further contact will usually involve personal
persuasion rather than information dispersion.
Of course, if the respective sides to the contest desire to hire
proxy solicitors at their own expense, there appears to be no
reason to prohibit it entirely, provided that all expenses incurred in that connection are borne personally by the respective groups and their followers. It is only when one group or the
other, or both seek to have the corporation bear the expense of
the solicitors that the prohibition arises.
Further considerations must be indulged in here, however,
for if these expenses are borne by the individual sides to the controversy, they are not deductible on the income tax returns of
the individual contributants.1" This disallowance of deductions
for these expenditures is a powerful deterrent to the use of
proxy solicitors, and perhaps it is just as well, because the best
interests of the corporation are made secondary to the best interests of the group hiring them Whenever proxy solicitors are
used.
Some proxy fights become very expensive affairs with both
sides attempting to "top" the other in favors bestowed upon
the stockholders. Elaborate parties are thrown, models hired
to "circulate," entertainers are hired to perform, etc. These expenses also seem to fall within the prohibition against proxy
solicitors. Although a certain amount of this type of "proxy
solicitation" may perhaps be legitimate, it is basically foreign
19 There has been no case to date specifically holding that such expenditures
cannot be deducted. However, from the language of sections 162 and 212 of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code and the case law interpreting them (see Bingham's Trust v.
Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945) for an interpretation of section 23 (a) (2) of the
1939 Code which is now section 212 of the 1954 Code), it is doubtful if such would
come within the definition of expenses that are "ordinary and necessary for the pro.
duction or collection of income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance
of property held for the production of income."
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to the interests of the corporation. It is hardly conceivable that
such expenditures aid in the furtherance of information dissemination to the stockholders in any way other than in the
contacts and conversations which necessarily occur at these parties. Here again, however, is the personal contact with the almost
sure pushing of personal motives rather than the virtues of the
respective corporate issues.
Although there has never been a ruling on any of the above
mentioned expenses, there is wording in the Fairchildcase to the
effect that such expenses, at least when pointed out to the court
as unwarranted, should be disallowed unless the propriety thereof
is proved to the courts' satisfaction. This reasoning is sound, and
should be followed. The only difficulty arises in determining
just what expenses are unwarranted and not to be allowed and
those that are to be allowed. It is submitted that only those expenses which bear a substantial relationship to the purpose behind allowing any expenses (i.e., full information dispersion
to the stockholders) should be permitted as a charge against the
corporate treasury. This rule is supported by reason, although
to date there has been no case law so holding, or any legislative
action in that direction. It is also a generality, but under the
present circumstances, it is at least a step in the right direction.
To say that only those expenditures can be allowed which
tend directly to accomplish this result is too restrictive, since
it is conceivable that local custom or other situations may arise
where the expenditures, though considered reasonable and necessary by all involved, would fall short of the required relation.
ship in the eyes of the law. This is a problem that cannot be
solved by hypothetical indulgences. Rather, it must be developed
in the courts by the application of the substantial relationship
test to the facts of each case. By using this doctrine as a guidepost, workable rules capable of practical application can be
established.
There seems to be no distinction made, as far as reimbursement of management goes, as to whether management wins or
loses the contest.20 As long as the court has found a policy issue
20 Steinberg v. Adams, supra note 1; Rosenfield v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane
Corp., supra note 1.
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involved, reimbursement follows almost as a matter of course,
irrespective of the outcome of the election.
1!. Expenses of the Successful Opposition.
Although there have been only two cases on the point," both of
them hold that the successful opposition group is entitled to be
reimbursed after they get into office. Thus, although it is scanty,
the only law on the subject allows reimbursement.
When it is understood that the reason underlying the allowance of reimbursement to the management group for their expenses in the proxy fight is to assure that the stockholders will
get an adequate presentation of all the issues involved, it becomes apparent that for the same reason the insurgent group,
under certain limitations later mentioned, should also be entitled to have the corporation bear their expenses.2 Before an
adequate presentation of all questions involved can be made, it
is essential that there be at least two opposing factions. Otherwise, stockholders would receive the benefit of the views of only
the management, and hence would receive a slanted view. This
is not to imply "slanted" in the nature of anything improper,
but it is only human nature that one expounds his own merits
and plays down his faults, and the same is true of corporate
directors. The two-faction contest thus puts before the stockholders different, and often opposite, views with all the ramifications of each. Hence, since the benefit to the corporation of
full disclosure is present whether the contesting faction wins the
election or not, the corporation should reimburse them for their
expenses. When the contesting group gains control of the corporation, the argument is even stronger in favor of reimbursement. It is evident in such a case that a majority of the stockholders agree with the proposals of the new management as being the soundest and in the best interests of the corporation.
Therefore, if the ousted management group whose views were
rejected is entitled to reimbursement, a fortiori the contesting
group which wins the election should be so entitled.
21
22

Ibid.
Friedman, Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests, 51 COL. L. REv. 951 (1951)

EMERSON

& LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER

DEMOCRACY,

Chapter VI (1954).
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A fairly recent case has expounded the same view, and in
fact so held." In that case the contesting group was successful
in ousting the management, and after doing so proceeded to reimburse themselves for their expenses. The court, expressly
making' no distinction between management and contestants,
said:
My own choice is to draw no distinction between the "ins" and the
"outs." I see no reason why the stockholders should not be free to
reimburse those whose expenditures succeeded in ridding a corporation
of a policy frowned upon by a majority of the stockholders. Once we
assert that incumbent directors may employ corporate funds in policy
contests to advocate their views to the stockholders, even if the stockholders ultimately reject their views, it seems permissible to me that
those who advocate a contrary policy and succeed in securing approval
from the stockholders should be able to receive reimbursement, at least
by both the board of directors and a majority
when there is approval
24
stockholders.
the
of
With the exception of the court's adherance to the policy requirement, it is submitted that these views are sound.
III. Expenses of the Unsuccessful Opposition
The case law on this point is entirely lacking, and as far as
search reveals, there is no authority whatsoever on the problem. However, the same reasoning which allows both the management group and the successful contesting group to secure corporate reimbursement also applies, although less strongly, to
reimbursement of the losing contestants. The fact that the contestants lose the election does not justify saying that the corporation received no benefit from their participation, and hence
should not bear any of their expenses.
The losing faction, just as the other factions involved in the
contest, serves to insure broad presentation of all information
about the questions involved in the coming election to the stockholders, and this is none the less true just because they happen
to fail to convince a majority of the stockholders that their position is the best one. However, lest there be wholesale minority
23 Steinberg v. Adams, supra note 1.
24

Id. at 606.
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participation in these elections, with as many contestants for control as there are dissatisfied stockholders, certain requisites
should be established that contestants have to fulfill before they
are entitled to be reimbursed.
One of the requisites should be that such contestants must
receive at least a stated percentage of the total votes cast at the
election.
Just what percentage is proper is open to debate, but as two
very excellent recent treatises have stated, the percentage should
perhaps be from 10 to 15 percent. A survey of the voting under
Rule X-14A.8 of the SEC Regulations governing proxy solicitation has determined that 30%o of the proposals at annual stockholder elections obtained an affirmative vote of less than 5%;
and 6% of the proposals obtained less than 8%.6 On the basis
of this survey, the above percentages of 10o and 15o appear
to be just about right as a minimum standard. However, if the
percentages established first appear to be either too high or too
low, correction could easily be made.
Further justification for reimbursing the losing contestants,
provided they present a meritorious position and obtain the
requisite percentage of votes cast, may be found in Section 14
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,"7 and the regulation
of proxies authorized by that section. That section has been extensively dealt with by Emerson and Latcham,2" but here it is
sufficient to say that Rule X-14A-8 requires management to provide a method whereby stockholders may present ideas and suggestions to other stockholders for their consideration and vote.
By extending the theory behind this act, that the legislature has
power and authority to prescribe rules and regulations governing the various problems presented by proxy solicitations and
contests, which must be followed by the corporations of the nation, it is possible for the commission to amend the proxy regulations and require management to reimburse unsuccessful opposition groups when they meet the above stated requirements.
25Friendman, Expenses of Corporate Proxy Contests, supra, note 22; EMERSON &
LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, supra note 22.
26 EMERSON & LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY, Chapter VIII (1954).
2748 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. sec. 78(n) (1946).
28 EMERSON & LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY (1954); see Friedman, SEC
Regulation of Corporate Proxies, 63 HARV. L. REv. 796 (1950).
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However, a failure on the part of the SEC to so act does not
preclude the desired result, since the way is then left open for
the states themselves to deal with the situation, either by legislation or judicial decision. Of course, a charter or by-law provision allowing such reimbursement would adequately handle
the outcome, but such is an unlikely inclusion in by-laws.
In conclusion, it is submitted that litigation will be facilitated,
the bench will be aided, and solidarity and uniformity will be
developed in the law if the following rules are followed in the
future: (1) The management group is entitled to draw on the
corporate treasury to finance their proxy fight whenever the
expenses are fair and reasonable, whether they win the election or not. (2) The contesting group is entitled to be reimbursed
for expenses incurred in their proxy fight when they win, if
their expenditures are fair and reasonable. (3) The contesting
group is entitled to be reimbursed when they lose if they gather
a designated percentage of the total votes cast (10%-15%) and
if the expenditures are fair and reasonable.
Gerry N. Wren.

REHABILITATION OF THE FIRST OFFENDER:
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE PRESENT TEXAS LAW

Retribution is no longer the dominant purpose of the criminal
law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.1
This statement by Mr. Justice Black expresses the viewpoint of
the modernized codes of criminal jurisprudence, and it is felt that
the times and conditions have made it apparent that legislation
aimed at the proper type of rehabilitation must be made effective
for those deemed worthy. Texas could well follow the examples
of the federal laws and other jurisdictions which have demonstrated that the proper type of probation is effective in eliminating
1 Williams v.

State of New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248, (1948).

